

Are Danes Just Xenophobes?

Examining the Establishment of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Denmark and Sweden

Louise Paulsen

Brigham Young University

March 27, 2018

Introduction

Denmark and Sweden share many similar demographic, historical and political characteristics. However, when it comes to the issue of immigration and anti-immigration parties (AIPs) the similarities seem to end. Since the 1970s, Denmark has had an influential AIP. This has only been the case in Sweden over the past decade. The puzzle gets complicated when realizing that Sweden has seen a much greater influx of immigrants and have much higher rates of right-wing extremist violence than Denmark. An initial attempt to address this puzzle would be to state that Danes are simply xenophobic and Swedes xenophiles. However, the high level of right-wing violence in Sweden indicates otherwise. This paper seeks to extend previous arguments for the lack of a successful AIP in Sweden (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Rydgren, 2010). As we will see, the decrease of socio-economic cleavages and an increase of the politicization of immigration in Sweden have created a favorable environment for an AIP to become successful.

Successful AIPs

The phenomenon of AIPs is spreading and so is the associated terminology that tries to capture its full meaning. It is important to acknowledge the theoretical difference between often and interchangeably used categorizations such as "nationalistic," "far-right," "right-wing," "xenophobic," and "anti-immigrant" parties. We will for our purposes use the term "anti-immigrant party." We do so with clear reference to Denmark's most recent and prominent AIP, Dansk Folkeparti ("Danish People's Party" or DPP) and Sweden's Sverige Demokraterne ("Sweden Democrats" or SD). Our outcome measure will be in the successfulness of the AIPs. According to David Art, an AIP is considered successful if it receives over 5% of the national votes in three consecutive national elections (Art, 2011).

Denmark

Denmark is home to one of Western Europe's oldest and most influential AIPs.

Fremskridtspartiet ("Progress Party" or PP) took Denmark by storm in a landslide election in 1972. As the first Danish AIP in post-WW2 times, PP received 15.9% of the national vote. The influence of an AIP has remained in the Danish Parliament since, although the influence of PP would dwindle in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Betz, 1994). In 1995 two prominent figures of PP broke out to form what is still known today as the DPP. It received 7.4% of the national votes in its first election in 1998 and provided parliamentary support for the conservative-liberal coalition from 2001-2011. This gave DPP the ability to influence policies (particularly on the issue of immigration) without taking any official seats in the government. Although a Social Democratic government was in place from 2011-2015, DPP remained the third-biggest political party in the Parliament with much bargaining power. The 2015 national election took DPP to its so-far highest peak with 21.1% of the votes. Although this made DPP the second largest political party in Parliament, they have still chosen to remain outside of government, positioning them as the parliamentary support for a, now, minority government. With this brief overview in mind, and by extending the influence of PP through the break-off party DPP, we can quickly determine that Denmark has long had a successful AIP (Art, 2011).

Sweden

As we will seek to explain, a long-standing successful AIP has not yet been seen in Sweden.

After several unsuccessful attempts to establish influential AIPs in Sweden,¹ SD emerged in 1988. SD remained a smaller party represented in local communes and in the European

¹ Bevara Sverige Svenskt ("Keep Sweden Swedish") was an anti-immigrant movement formed in 1972 which later merged with the populist party Framstegspartiet ("Progress Party"). The merged party became known as Sverigepartiet ("Sweden Party") but regroup as the Sweden Democrats just two years later in 1988.

Parliament until 2006 when it rose above 1.5% of the national vote for the first time (although this was still well below the 4% Swedish electoral threshold needed to gain representation in the Swedish Parliament). The two following national elections were very fruitful for SD that received 5.7% of the votes in the 2010 general election and 12.9% in the 2014 election (see Appendix, Table 1). It is now expected to be considered successful first after the upcoming general elections on September 9, 2018. In an average of four independent opinion polls conducted in March 2018, SD lands at 19.575% of the popular votes (yougov.se, 2018; IPSOS, 2018; SIFO, 2018; Frick; 2018).). The 12.9% of the votes in 2014 manifested itself in 49 seats in Parliament. If the estimations of polls are anywhere near correct, 20% of the votes would result in 70 seats.

Claims

The Swedish anomaly has been noted by many but attempted explained by few.

Shortly stated, the popular notion seeks to explain the anomaly by classifying Danes as xenophobic and Swedes as xenophiles. But this is an oversimplification of reality. Additionally, Sweden has higher levels of right-wing extremist violence per capita than any other European country (Ravndal, 2016). Other explanations include differences in electoral thresholds, political strategies among mainstream parties (Dahlström, Carl and Peter Esaiasson, 2013), and proportional representation as lending itself to more favorable conditions for extremist parties. But two arguments stand out as having stood the test for explaining the anomaly up until 2006. Firstly, socio-economic cleavages have “protected” Sweden from the rise of an AIP, and secondly, Denmark has seen a much greater politicization of immigration issues (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Rydgren, 2010). Since SD has risen to an almost “successful” level over the

past decade, it is crucial to analyze if the same arguments can explain the now rise in a Swedish AIP. We'll expect to see this through the decrease of socio-economic cleavages in Sweden and the increase of the politicization of immigration issues in Sweden.


Socio-Economic Cleavages

Socio-economic cleavages align voters with political parties no matter their specific policy stances. It is a sense of party loyalty that is based on socioeconomic (or “class”) voting. This has long been decreasing in Denmark (Rydgren, 2010), and has recently been on the decline in Sweden as well. This is best seen in decreasing levels of class-voting, which in turn leads to floating voters, as we shall see in the following data.

Class voting

Class voting has been on a steady decline in Sweden in 1994. This results in less party loyalty and therefore more maneuver room for an AIP to compete for the votes. The decrease in class voting is seen most poignantly in Table 2. Table 2 describes the socialist voting patterns of the working class and the middle class from 1956-2014.

Table 2




Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Class voting was already on the decline from 1994-2002 with a decrease from 70% in 1994 to 66% in 2002. But the decline was much starker from 66% in 2002 to only 51% in 2014.


Interestingly, the middle class increased its class voting from 2010-2014 after a steady decline since 1994.²

Table 3



Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 4



Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.


² This raises two additional questions for further research: What happened in 1994? And how does this correlate with what seems to be the main shift of voters from M-SD?

Table 3 indicates an interesting increase of voter turnout among workers since 2002 and Table 4 an equally interesting increase of voter turnout among voters who claim to be “not particularly interested” and “not at all interested” in politics. Finally, Tables 9 and 10 (see Appendix) show the increasing importance of elderly voters among SD’s supporters (more about SD’s mobilization of these two categories of voters at a later point). Table 5 (see Appendix) show a larger decrease in socialist voting among public sector employees since 2002 than among private sector employees.

Floating Voters

Another aspect of the decrease in socio-economic cleavages is seen in floating voters. This is in essence the manifestation of the decrease in class voting, as explained above. We see this clearly in Table 6. 2006 saw a high jump from 31.8% to 37.1% of voters changing parties from the previous election in 2002. This was the year that SD started advancing on the political stage. How big of a percentage changes to SD are of the total 37.1% does not appear from the data.

Table 6



Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 7 (see Appendix) show a decreasing percentage of voters voting for the same party three elections in a row from 1976-2014. Table 8 tells us a part of the story of the most common move of SD voters: to Moderaterne (“Moderates,” a Swedish Conservative Party or M). When asked why voters made the change from SD to M, the most common answer was given as “Sweden should receive less refugees.” Table 8 indicates that this is largely due to the increased politicization of immigration issues, which leaves us to our second claim.

Politicization of Immigration

The politicization of immigration issues is increasing in Sweden. The politicization of immigration issues (along with agenda setting and framing) increase public attention and awareness on the issue and can act as an advantage to those political parties with platforms around the issues of immigration. I assume that a part of this is due to a culture of political correctness embedded in Sweden, something that is not found to the same degree in Danish culture. Political correctness bars the establishment of AIPs because it keeps immigration from being discussed in any form. Thus the “voicing” of concerns is not legitimized and/or facilitated. It is expected that the lack of such a political “voicing” channel has created a more fertile ground for extreme right-wing violence. However the change in the public’s political correctness, the politicization of immigration issues is now on the rise in Sweden.

Table 11

| Issue Area | 1979 | 1982 | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2014 |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Health Care/Welfare | 4 | 12 | 19 | 15 | 22 | 21 | 28 | 36 | 32 | 37 | 43 |
| Education | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 20 | 29 | 24 | 26 | 41 |
| Full Employment | 18 | 29 | 25 | 5 | 23 | 41 | 34 | 7 | 35 | 31 | 30 |
| Immigration/Refugees | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 10 | 5 | 9 | 23 |
| Environment | 6 | 7 | 22 | 46 | 25 | 20 | 12 | 8 | 11 | 13 | 20 |
| Pensions/Care of Elderly | 5 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 20 | 9 | 17 | 20 | 21 | 19 | 17 |
| Economy | 9 | 14 | 14 | 8 | 20 | 30 | 14 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 15 |
| Taxes | 17 | 8 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 9 | 17 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 11 |
| Gender Equality | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Family/Child Care | 8 | 8 | 17 | 16 | 18 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 15 | 6 | 4 |
| Energy/Nuclear Power | 26 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Public vs Private Sector | 5 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Agriculture | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Housing | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Religion/Moral | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| EU/EMU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Wage Earners' Funds | 4 | 33 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Percentage of voters who mentioned at least one issue | 63 | 76 | 78 | 72 | 82 | 79 | 77 | 73 | 80 | 86 | 90 |

Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

In Table 11 we see that from 2010-14, the importance of the immigration issue rose from 9-23%. This clearly indicates a politicization of and heightened interest in immigration. Concern for taxes and the economy went down in the same period. Interestingly, as we see in Table 14 (see Appendix), the largest margin SD won in the reported poll was based on “campaign performance voting” (32%). This could potentially be interpreted as taking advantage of a higher politicization of immigration issues in the public debate. Besides this, the highest ranked reason for voting for the SD is prospective voting (“the party has a good program for the future”) at 44%.

Conclusions

Previous research has explained the lack of a Swedish AIP. But it looks like the same theories can explain the rise of SD over the past decade. A decline in class-voting, increase of floating

voters, and a heightened focus on immigration in political issues all help explain the fertile ground for SD. More research is to be done beyond the current study. For what has brought about these recent changes in Sweden? And do we expect the trend to continue? To what degree is the delayed AIP success in Sweden a product of Swedish political correctness? There are thus many additional questions to seek answers to. However, the data presented in this study help us answer our initial puzzle of ‘what is going on in Sweden’? It is clear that Sweden was a Scandinavian anomaly for many years but is now undergoing a similar change in its political landscape as seen in other neighboring countries. This is a change that is only expected to evolve after this year’s elections. As such we see that the successfulness of a country’s AIP(s) cannot be reduced to a question of mere xenophobia. Structural, socio-economic, and cultural components that go beyond the simple fear of immigrants are needed in order for such a fear to establish itself in a successful political party. Whereas the present study has focused solely on the establishment of successful AIPs, it is yet to be seen if a reversal of the explanatory trends would result in a decreasing success among AIPs. If so, a powerful tool for countering the growing influence of AIPs in Scandinavia would be found.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agius, Christine. 2013. "Performing identity: The Danish cartoon crisis and discourses of identity and security." *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 3: 241-258.
- Anderson, Benedict. 2006. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, Verso Books.
- Art, David. 2011. *Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe*, Cambridge University Press.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, St. Martin's Press.
- Boréus, Kristina. 2010. "Including or excluding immigrants? The impact of right-wing populism in Denmark and Sweden." *Diversity, inclusion and citizenship in Scandinavia*: 127-158.
- Camus, Jean-Yves and Nicolas Lebourg. 2017. *Far-Right Politics in Europe*, Harvard University Press.
- Dahlström, Carl and Peter Esaiasson. 2013. "The immigration issue and anti-immigrant party success in Sweden 1970-2006: A deviant case analysis." *Party Politics* 19, no. 2: 343-364.
- Frick, Chang. March 2018. "SD Utmanar S om Förstaplatsen i Sentio." *Nyheter Idag*. Retrieved at: <https://nyheteridag.se/sd-utmanar-s-om-forstaplatsen-i-sentio/>.
- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Jesper Krogstrup. 2008. "Immigration as a political issue in Denmark and Sweden." *European Journal of Political Research* 47, no. 5: 610-634.
- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Pontus Odmalm. 2008. "Going different ways? Right-wing parties and the immigrant issue in Denmark and Sweden." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 3: 367-381.
- IPSOS Public Affairs. 2018. *DN/IPSOS Politisk Barometer 22 mars 2018*. Retrieved at: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2018-03/dn_ipsos_politisk_barometer_mars_2018_webb.pdf.
- Kantar SIFO. 2018. *Väljarbarometern Mars 2018*. Retrieved at: <https://www.kantarsifo.se/rapporter-undersokningar/valjarbarometern-mars-2018>.
- Mouritsen, Per and Tore Vincents Olsen. 2013. "Denmark between liberalism and nationalism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 4: 691-710.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge University Press.
- Ravndal, Jacob Aasland. 2016. "Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV dataset." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 3.

- Rydgren, Jens. 2010. "Radical Right-wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System Change and Stability." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 30, no. 1: 57-71.
- . . 2008. "Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 47, no. 6: 737-765.
- . . 2007. "The Sociology of the Radical Right." *Annual Review of Sociology*, no. 33: 241-262.
- . . 2006. *From tax populism to ethnic nationalism: Radical right-wing populism in Sweden*, Berghahn Books.
- . . 2005. "Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family." *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 3: 413-437.
- . . 2004. "Explaining the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties: The case of Denmark." *West European Politics* 27, no. 3: 474-502.
- . . 2002. "Radical right populism in Sweden: Still a failure, but for how long?" *Scandinavian Political Studies* 25, no. 1: 27-56.
- Rydgren, Jens and Patrick Ruth. 2013. "Contextual explanations of radical right-wing support in Sweden: socioeconomic marginalization, group threat, and the halo effect." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 4: 711-728.
- Swedish National Election Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. 2015. *Väljarnas Sakfrågeåsikter 1956-2014*. Retrieved at: https://valforskning.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1550/1550463_v--ljarnas-sakfr--ge--sikter.pdf.
- Swedish National Election Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. 2017. *Swedish Voting Behavior*. Retrieved at: https://valforskning.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1659/1659472_swedish-voting-behavior--oktober-2017.pdf.
- Statistics Sweden. 2016. *Democracy Statistics Report no 21: Floating voters*. Retrieved from: http://www.scb.se/Statistik/_Publikationer/ME0106_2014A01F_BR_ME09BR1601.pdf.
- Widfeldt, Anders. 2008. "Party change as a necessity—the case of the Sweden Democrats." *Representation* 44, no. 3: 265-276.
- Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral. 2013. *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*, Bloomsbury Academic.

YouGov. 2018. *Väljaropinion i Samarbete med Metro*. Retrieved at:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6iaj7jj4hf/Opinion_Metro_YouGov_Mar2018.pdf.

APPENDIX


Table 1

| Swedish Election Results 1976 – 2014 (percent) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Party | 1976 | 1979 | 1982 | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2014 |
| V | 4,8 | 5,6 | 5,6 | 5,4 | 5,9 | 4,5 | 6,2 | 12,0 | 8,4 | 5,9 | 5,6 | 5,7 |
| S | 42,7 | 43,2 | 45,6 | 44,7 | 43,2 | 37,7 | 45,2 | 36,4 | 39,9 | 35,0 | 30,7 | 31,0 |
| MP | - | - | 1,6 | 1,5 | 5,5 | 3,4 | 5,0 | 4,5 | 4,6 | 5,2 | 7,3 | 6,9 |
| C | 24,1 | 18,1 | 15,5 | 10,1 | 11,3 | 8,5 | 7,7 | 5,1 | 6,2 | 7,9 | 6,6 | 6,1 |
| FP | 11,1 | 10,6 | 5,9 | 14,2 | 12,2 | 9,1 | 7,2 | 4,7 | 13,4 | 7,5 | 7,0 | 5,4 |
| KD | 1,4 | 1,4 | 1,9 | 2,3 | 2,9 | 7,2 | 4,1 | 11,8 | 9,1 | 6,6 | 5,6 | 4,6 |
| M | 15,6 | 20,3 | 23,6 | 21,3 | 18,3 | 21,9 | 22,4 | 22,9 | 15,3 | 26,2 | 30,1 | 23,3 |
| NYD | - | - | - | - | - | 6,7 | 1,2 | - | - | - | - | - |
| SD | - | - | - | - | 0,02 | 0,1 | 0,3 | 0,4 | 1,4 | 2,9 | 5,7 | 12,9 |
| FI | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0,7 | 0,4 | 3,1 |
| Minor Parties | 0,3 | 0,8 | 0,3 | 0,5 | 0,7 | 0,9 | 0,7 | 2,2 | 1,7 | 2,1 | 1,0 | 1,0 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Turnout | 91,8 | 90,7 | 91,4 | 89,9 | 86,0 | 86,7 | 86,8 | 81,4 | 80,1 | 82,0 | 84,6 | 85,8 |

Comment: Parliamentary elections only; official results. The initials for the parties are the customary ones in Sweden: V=Left Party, S=Social Democratic, C=Center, FP=Liberal, M=Conservative, KD=Christian Democrat, MP=Green, NYD=New Democrats, SD=Sweden Democrats and FI=Feminist Initiative.


Source: Swedish National Election Studies (SNES), *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 2




Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 3




Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 4




Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 5



Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 6




Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 7

Figur 4

Trevälsrörlighet i svenska riksdagsval. Andel som röstar på samma/olika partier i tre på varandra följande riksdagsval 1976-2014 (procent).

Figure 4. Individual level three election volatility in swedish general elections. Proportion of voters voting for the same/different parties at three consecutive elections 1976-2014 (Per cent).




Kommentar: Uppgifter om partival i tre efter varandra följande riksdagsval bygger på analyser av valundersökningarnas tvåvalspaneler och vilar på panelernas valminne från tidpunkt 1, uppgivet partival vid tidpunkt 2 och uppgivet partival vid tidpunkt 3. Antalet svarande för de tre senaste mellanvalspanelerna är 650, 795 respektive 928 personer. För de tidigare panelanalyserna varierar antalet svarande med mellan 1 000-1 500 personer.

Källa: Svenska valundersökningar, rullande tvåstegspaneler 1976-2014.


Source: Statistics Sweden, *Democracy Statistics Report no 21: Floating voters*, 2016.

Table 8



Source: Statistics Sweden, *Democracy Statistics Report no 21: Floating voters*, 2016.

Table 9



Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 10

In Which Age Group Does the Parties Have Their Strongest Support?

| election year | party | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|--------------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|---------|------------|-------|-------|
| | V | S | C | FP | M | KD | MP | SD | FI |
| 1948 | young | no diff | old | young | old | - | - | - | - |
| 1956 | - | young | old | old | no diff | - | - | - | - |
| 1960 | old | young | old | old | old | - | - | - | - |
| 1964 | old | no diff | middle age | no diff | old | - | - | - | - |
| 1968 | no diff | no diff | middle age | young | old | - | - | - | - |
| 1970 | young | no diff | young | old | old | - | - | - | - |
| 1973 | young | middle age | young | old | old | - | - | - | - |
| 1976 | young | middle age | young | young/old | middle age | - | - | - | - |
| 1979 | young | old | old | young | middle age | - | - | - | - |
| 1982 | young | old | old | no diff | middle age | - | - | - | - |
| 1985 | young | old | old | no diff | young | old | young | - | - |
| 1988 | young | old | old | young | young | old | middle age | - | - |
| 1991 | middle age | old | old | young | young | old | young | - | - |
| 1994 | young | old | old | no diff | old | no diff | young | - | - |
| 1998 | young | old | old | young | young | old | young | - | - |
| 2002 | young | middle/old | old | young | no diff | old | young | - | - |
| 2006 | young/middle | old | old | no diff | no diff | old | young | young | - |
| 2010 | young/middle | old | old | old | middle age | old | young | young | - |
| 2014 | no diff | old | no diff | no diff | middle age | old | young | old | young |

Comment: Young is defined as 18 – 30 years, middle age as 31 – 60 and old as 61 – 80. No diff means there is no difference in party support across age groups.

Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 11

| Election Issues in Sweden 1979-2014. Percentage of Party Voters Who on an Open-Ended Question Mentioned the Various Issue Areas as Important for Their Party Choice (percent) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Issue Area | 1979 | 1982 | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2014 |
| Health Care/Welfare | 4 | 12 | 19 | 15 | 22 | 21 | 28 | 36 | 32 | 37 | 43 |
| Education | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 20 | 29 | 24 | 26 | 41 |
| Full Employment | 18 | 29 | 25 | 5 | 23 | 41 | 34 | 7 | 35 | 31 | 30 |
| Immigration/Refugees | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 10 | 5 | 9 | 23 |
| Environment | 6 | 7 | 22 | 46 | 25 | 20 | 12 | 8 | 11 | 13 | 20 |
| Pensions/Care of Elderly | 5 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 20 | 9 | 17 | 20 | 21 | 19 | 17 |
| Economy | 9 | 14 | 14 | 8 | 20 | 30 | 14 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 15 |
| Taxes | 17 | 8 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 9 | 17 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 11 |
| Gender Equality | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Family/Child Care | 8 | 8 | 17 | 16 | 18 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 15 | 6 | 4 |
| Energy/Nuclear Power | 26 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Public vs Private Sector | 5 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Agriculture | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Housing | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Religion/Moral | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| EU/EMU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Wage Earners' Funds | 4 | 33 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Percentage of voters who mentioned at least one issue | 63 | 76 | 78 | 72 | 82 | 79 | 77 | 73 | 80 | 86 | 90 |

Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.

Table 12

Tabell 29.2 Åsikter om politiskt förslag: flyktingar

fråga: Om Du använder skalan på det här kortet, vilken är Din åsikt om förslaget att: Ta emot förre flyktingar i Sverige?

| | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1970 | 1973 | 1976 | 1979 | 1982 | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2014 |
|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| mycket bra förslag | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 14 | 23 | 23 | 19 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 11 |
| ganska bra förslag | 2 | | | | | | | | | | 22 | 30 | 31 | 25 | 29 | 24 | 21 | 22 |
| varken bra eller dåligt förslag | 3 | | | | | | | | | | 23 | 20 | 23 | 28 | 24 | 26 | 26 | 22 |
| ganska dåligt förslag | 4 | | | | | | | | | | 23 | 19 | 16 | 19 | 22 | 24 | 28 | 25 |
| mycket dåligt förslag | 5 | | | | | | | | | | 18 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 14 | 15 | 19 |
| summa procent | | | | | | | | | | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| antal personer | | | | | | | | | | | 2439 | 2407 | 2231 | 1756 | 2039 | 1807 | 1314 | 1626 |
| medeltal | | | | | | | | | | | 3,09 | 2,58 | 2,52 | 2,74 | 2,86 | 3,05 | 3,15 | 3,18 |
| andel vet ej/ej svar | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| eta partival | | | | | | | | | | | 0,21 | 0,31 | 0,24 | 0,19 | 0,25 | 0,31 | 0,35 | 0,50 |

Source: SNES, *Väljarnas Sakfrågeåsikter 1956-2014*, 2015.

Table 13

Tabell 29.3 Åsikter om utformningen av det framtida samhället: Ett mångkulturellt samhälle

fråga: Om Du använder skalan på det här kortet, vilken är Din åsikt om förslaget att: Satsa på ett mångkulturellt samhälle med stor tolerans gentemot människor från andra länder med andra religioner och levnadssätt?

| | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1970 | 1973 | 1976 | 1979 | 1982 | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2014 | |
|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| mycket dåligt förslag | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 |
| | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 |
| varken bra eller dåligt förslag | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 24 | 22 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 16 |
| | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 9 |
| | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 17 |
| | 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 10 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 15 |
| | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 7 |
| mycket bra förslag | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 10 | 13 | 14 | 12 | 13 | 21 |
| summa procent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| antal personer | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2233 | 1777 | 2019 | 1824 | 1320 | 1001 |
| medeltal | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5,53 | 6,05 | 6,19 | 6,03 | 6,03 | 6,83 |
| andel vet ej/ej svar | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| eta partival | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0,19 | 0,16 | 0,22 | 0,31 | 0,32 | 0,46 |

Source: SNES, *Väljarnas Sakfrågeåsikter 1956-2014*, 2015.

Table 14

Voters' Self Reported Reasons for the Choice of Party. Percent saying "One of the most important reasons" among All Voters in 1988, 1994, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 and among Party Voters in 2014

| Theoretical Explanation | Reason to Vote | Year | | | | | | 2014 | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--|
| | | 1988 | 1994 | 2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2014 | V | S | MP | C | FP | KD | M | SD | FI | |
| Issue voting | The party has a good policy on issues that I think is important | - | - | 51 | - | 58 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Competence Voting | The party has competent persons that can run the country | 30 | 31 | 31 | 42 | 51 | 54 | 44 | 51 | 53 | 53 | 51 | 48 | 76 | 34 | 32 | |
| Ideological Voting | The party has a good political ideology | 41 | 41 | 45 | 49 | 49 | 54 | 74 | 57 | 71 | 55 | 45 | 54 | 40 | 27 | 82 | |
| Prospective Voting | The party has a good program for the future | - | - | 34 | 46 | 49 | 51 | 49 | 47 | 72 | 46 | 50 | 43 | 53 | 44 | 58 | |
| Government voting | The party is needed to make it possible to form my favourite government | - | - | - | - | - | 42 | 52 | 37 | 40 | 36 | 43 | 59 | 38 | 38 | 72 | |
| Campaign Agenda Voting | The party has good policies on many of the issues in recent public debates | 33 | 32 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 41 | 55 | 37 | 44 | 46 | 40 | 30 | 42 | 37 | 50 | |
| Retrospective Voting | The party has done a good job in recent years | - | - | 25 | 22 | 36 | 27 | 16 | 21 | 28 | 24 | 12 | 15 | 51 | 18 | 18 | |
| Party Leader Voting | The party has a good party leader | 23 | 20 | 24 | 23 | 27 | 28 | 19 | 27 | 11 | 19 | 17 | 20 | 44 | 36 | 28 | |
| Habitual Voting | I always vote for the party | 27 | 21 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 6 | 18 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 2 | |
| Class voting | The policies of the party is usually favourable to the occupational group to which I belong | 21 | 18 | 14 | 15 | 14 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Party Identification Voting | I feel like a supporter of the party | 21 | 16 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 10 | 13 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 18 | |
| Campaign Performance Voting | The party has been convincing during the election campaign | - | - | - | 18 | 17 | 16 | 19 | 10 | 25 | 10 | 13 | 12 | 32 | 28 | - | |
| Instrumental Voting | The party is a big party and therefore it has greater possibilities than a smaller party to implement its policies | - | - | 14 | 17 | 16 | 15 | 4 | 23 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 22 | 12 | 8 | |
| Group Interest Voting | The policy of the party is favourable to me personally | - | - | - | - | - | 13 | 7 | 13 | 10 | 11 | 5 | 17 | 19 | 11 | 8 | |
| | The policy of the party is usually favourable to my occupation group | 21 | 18 | 14 | 15 | 14 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Candidate Voting | The party has good Riksdag candidates on the ballot in my constituency | - | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 6 | 14 | 2 | 23 | 9 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 8 | |
| Tactical Voting | The party is a small party that risks falling under the four percent threshold to the Riksdag | - | - | 6 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 15 | 5 | 32 | 4 | 13 | 30 | |
| Social Influence Voting | People around me sympathize with the party | - | - | - | - | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |

Comment: "You say you are going to vote for [] in this year's Riksdag election. How important are the following reasons for your choice of party?". The alternatives were "one of the most important reasons", "fairly important reason", "not particularly important reason" and "not at all important reason".

Source: SNES, *Swedish Voting Behavior*, 2017.